Lecture

Coalitions and Group Decisions

Graph Chat

Chat with Graph Search

Ask any question about EPFL courses, lectures, exercises, research, news, etc. or try the example questions below.

DISCLAIMER: The Graph Chatbot is not programmed to provide explicit or categorical answers to your questions. Rather, it transforms your questions into API requests that are distributed across the various IT services officially administered by EPFL. Its purpose is solely to collect and recommend relevant references to content that you can explore to help you answer your questions.

In course

CS-430: Intelligent agents

Software agents are widely used to control physical, economic and financial processes. The course presents practical methods for implementing software agents and multi-agent systems, supported by programming exercises, and the theoretical underpinnings inc ...

Description

This lecture covers Cooperative Game Theory, focusing on group decision making, various voting protocols, manipulation, and the complexity of games with more than two players. It delves into coalitions, coalition stability, Shapley values, and coalition structures. The instructor explains the concept of coalitional game theory, the stability of coalitions, determining the core, computing the Shapley value, and the challenges of weighted graph games. Additionally, the lecture explores the use of Shapley values in machine learning for credit assignment and discusses the problems and potential manipulations in different voting protocols, such as plurality voting, Borda count, Slater ranking, and randomized voting.

Instructor

Boi Faltings

Professor Faltings joined EPFL in 1987 as professor of Artificial Intelligence. He holds a PhD degree from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and a diploma from the ETHZ. His research has spanned different areas of intelligent systems linked to model-based reasoning. In particular, he has contributed to qualitative spatial reasoning, case-based reasoning (especially for design problems), constraint satisfaction for design and logistics problems, multi-agent systems, and intelligent user interfaces. His current work is oriented towards multi-agent systems and social computing, using concepts of game theory, constraint optimization and machine learning. In 1999, Professor Faltings co-founded Iconomic Systems, a company that developed a new agent-based paradigm for travel e-commerce. He has since co-founded 5 other startup companies and advised several others. Prof. Faltings has published more than 150 refereed papers on his work, and participates regularly in program committees of all major conferences in the field. He has served as associate editor of of the major journals, including the Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR) and the Artificial Intelligence Journal. From 1996 to 1998, he served as head of the computer science department.

Official source

Ontological neighbourhood

Politics

Political science: Comparative politics

Related concepts (32)

Condorcet winner criterion

An electoral system satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion (pronkɒndɔrˈseɪ) if it always chooses the Condorcet winner when one exists. The candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates - that is, a candidate preferred by more voters than any others - is the Condorcet winner, although Condorcet winners do not exist in all cases. It is sometimes simply referred to as the "Condorcet criterion", though it is very different from the "Condorcet loser criterion".

Condorcet method

A Condorcet method (pronkɒndɔrˈseɪ; kɔ̃dɔʁsɛ) is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, that is, a candidate preferred by more voters than any others, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner. The head-to-head elections need not be done separately; a voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking.

Condorcet paradox

The Condorcet paradox (also known as the voting paradox or the paradox of voting) in social choice theory is a situation noted by the Marquis de Condorcet in the late 18th century, in which collective preferences can be cyclic, even if the preferences of individual voters are not cyclic. This is paradoxical, because it means that majority wishes can be in conflict with each other: Suppose majorities prefer, for example, candidate A over B, B over C, and yet C over A.

Minimax Condorcet method

In voting systems, the Minimax Condorcet method (often referred to as "the Minimax method") is one of several Condorcet methods used for tabulating votes and determining a winner when using ranked voting in a single-winner election. It is sometimes referred to as the Simpson–Kramer method, and the successive reversal method. Minimax selects as the winner the candidate whose greatest pairwise defeat is smaller than the greatest pairwise defeat of any other candidate: or, put another way, "the only candidate whose support never drops below [N] percent" in any pairwise contest, with N as high as possible.

Condorcet loser criterion

In single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion but does not imply the Condorcet winner criterion. A voting system complying with the Condorcet loser criterion will never allow a Condorcet loser to win. A Condorcet loser is a candidate who can be defeated in a head-to-head competition against each other candidate.

Related lectures (64)

Election Methods: Desirable Properties

Discusses election methods' desirable properties, multi-winner methods, district representation, gerrymandering, and the tyranny of the majority.

CS-234 - Week 5

Social Influence and Choice

Explores social influence, democracy, individual autonomy, equality, and decision-making models.

Zero-Sum Games: Concepts and Applications

Covers zero-sum games, focusing on Nash equilibria, security strategies, and their applications in various scenarios.

Static Games: Introduction to Game Theory Concepts