Publication

Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the Hungarian Method

Publications associées (23)

AI-driven Prices for Externalities and Sustainability in Production Markets

Boi Faltings, Panayiotis Danassis, Aris Filos Ratsikas

Traditional competitive markets do not account for negative externalities; indirect costs that some participants impose on others, such as the cost of over-appropriating a common-pool resource (which diminishes future stock, and thus harvest, for everyone) ...

Cornell University2023

Equilibria in Network Constrained Energy Markets

Leonardo Massai

We study an energy market composed of producers who compete to supply energy to different markets and want to maximize their profits. The energy market is modeled by a graph representing a constrained power network where nodes represent the markets and lin ...

Elsevier2023

Incentive Mechanism in the Sponsored Content Market With Network Effects

Olga Fink, Mina Montazeri

We propose an incentive mechanism for the sponsored content provider (CP) market in which the communication of users can be represented by a graph, and the private information of the users is assumed to have a continuous distribution function. The CP stipu ...

IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC2023

Optimization and equilibrium problems with discrete choice models

Stefano Bortolomiol

Many transportation markets are characterized by oligopolistic competition. In these markets customers, suppliers and regulators make decisions that are influenced by the preferences and the decisions of all other agents. In particular, capturing and under ...

EPFL2022

Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets

Julien Hugonnier

We study a canonical model of decentralized exchange for a durable good or asset, where agents are assumed to have time-varying, heterogeneous utility types. Whereas the existing literature has focused on the special case of two types, we allow agents' uti ...

ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY2022

Scalable Multi-agent Coordination and Resource Sharing

Panayiotis Danassis

A plethora of real world problems consist of a number of agents that interact, learn, cooperate, coordinate, and compete with others in ever more complex environments. Examples include autonomous vehicles, robotic agents, intelligent infrastructure, IoT de ...

EPFL2022

Informational frictions in financial markets

Erik Hapnes

This thesis consists of three chapters on informational frictions in financial markets. The chapters analyze problems related to markets' ability to guide real investment, and what drives liquidity. Both problems are important to ensure efficient resource ...

EPFL2021

A Simulation-Based Heuristic to Find Approximate Equilibria with Disaggregate Demand Models

Michel Bierlaire, Virginie Janine Camille Lurkin, Stefano Bortolomiol

Oligopolistic competition occurs in various transportation markets. In this paper, we introduce a framework to find approximate equilibrium solutions of oligopolistic markets in which demand is modeled at the disaggregate level using discrete choice models ...

INFORMS2021

Price-based regulation of oligopolistic markets under discrete choice models of demand

Michel Bierlaire, Virginie Janine Camille Lurkin, Stefano Bortolomiol

We propose a framework to find optimal price-based policies to regulate markets characterized by oligopolistic competition and in which consumers make a discrete choice among a finite set of alternatives. The framework accommodates general discrete choice ...

2022

Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions

Daniel Kuhn, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Cagil Kocyigit

We study a robust auction design problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller seeks a mechanism for selling multiple items to multiple anonymous bidders with additive values. The seller knows that the bidders' values range over a box uncertainty ...

2024

Distributional Robustness in Mechanism Design

Cagil Kocyigit

Mechanism design theory examines the design of allocation mechanisms or incentive systems involving multiple rational but self-interested agents and plays a central role in many societally important problems in economics. In mechanism design problems, agen ...

EPFL2020

A demand-based optimization approach to find market equilibria in oligopolies

Stefano Bortolomiol

Oligopolistic competition occurs often in transportation as well as in other markets due to reasons such as barriers to entry, limited capacity of the infrastructure and external regulations. In transport oligopolies, suppliers are profit maximizers and ta ...

2019

Scheduling trips through a bottleneck: monotonicity and stability

Nikolaos Geroliminis, Raphael Ali Francis Lamotte

This paper investigates the stability of departure time choice within a population of commuters that need to pass through a bottleneck of constant capacity. It is shown that the corresponding utility function is monotonic if and only if the marginal utilit ...

2019

Three Problems of Liquidity under Asymmetric Information

Sylvain Jean Pascal Carré

This thesis develops models for three problems of liquidity under asymmetric information. In the chapter "Disclosures, Rollover Risk, and Debt Runs" I build a model of dynamic debt runs without perfect information in order to understand the impact of asset ...

EPFL2019

A demand-based optimization approach to find market equilibria in oligopolies

Michel Bierlaire, Virginie Janine Camille Lurkin, Stefano Bortolomiol

Oligopolistic competition occurs when a small number of operators compete for the same pool of customers. This is often the case in transportation, due to reasons such as external regulations, economies of scale and limited capacity of the infrastructure. ...

2019

Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-unit Markets

Aris Filos Ratsikas

In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept that retain its ...

AAAI Press2019

Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

Thomas Alois Weber

To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a "canonical extension," which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment meas ...

2019

Liquidity, Innovation, And Endogenous Growth

Semyon Malamud, Francesca Maria Zucchi

We build a model of endogenous, innovation-driven growth in which innovative firms have costly access to outside financing and hoard cash reserves to maintain financial flexibility. We show that financing frictions slow down Schumpeterian creative destruct ...

2019

Equilibrium Models for Derivatives Markets with Frictions

Yuan Zhang

This thesis develops equilibrium models, and studies the effects of market frictions on risk-sharing, derivatives pricing, and trading patterns. In the chapter titled "Imbalance-Based Option Pricing", I develop an equilibrium model of fragmented options m ...

EPFL2018

Robust Multidimensional Pricing: Separation without Regret

Daniel Kuhn, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Cagil Kocyigit

We study a robust monopoly pricing problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller endeavors to sell multiple goods to a single buyer, only knowing that the buyer's values for the goods range over a rectangular uncertainty set. We interpret this pr ...

2022