Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge, i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls. Protecting the backwa ...
Nanoscale devices exhibiting memristive properties show great potential in a plethora of applications. In this work, memristive nanowires are presented for the first time as ideal candidates for absolutely novel, ultrasensitive, highly specific and selecti ...
Memory and logic integration on the same chip is becoming increasingly cost effective, creating the opportunity to offload data-intensive functionality to processing units placed inside memory chips. The introduction of memory-side processing units (MPUs) ...
Systems code is often written in low-level languages like C/C++, which offer many benefits but also delegate memory management to programmers. This invites memory safety bugs that attackers can exploit to divert control flow and compromise the system. Depl ...
Automated vulnerability searching tools have led to a dramatic increase of the rate at which such flaws are discovered. One particular searching technique is fault injection i.e. insertion of random data into input files, buffers or protocol packets, combi ...
