Interactions are ubiquitous in our world, spanning from social interactions between human individuals to physical interactions between robots and objects to mechanistic interactions among different components of an intelligent system. Despite their prevale ...
International benchmarking competitions have become fundamental for the comparative performance assessment of image analysis methods. However, little attention has been given to investigating what can be learnt from these competitions. Do they really gener ...
This paper considers the problem of resilient distributed optimization and stochastic learning in a server-based architecture. The system comprises a server and multiple agents, where each agent has its own local cost function. The agents collaborate with ...
We study an energy market composed of producers who compete to supply energy to different markets and want to maximize their profits. The energy market is modeled by a graph representing a constrained power network where nodes represent the markets and lin ...
Order, regularities, and patterns are ubiquitous around us. A flock of birds maneuvering in the sky, the self-organization of social insects, a global pandemic or a traffic jam are examples of complex systems where the macroscopic patterns arise from the m ...
We develop a principled approach to end-to-end learning in stochastic optimization. First, we show that the standard end-to-end learning algorithm admits a Bayesian interpretation and trains a posterior Bayes action map. Building on the insights of this an ...
This paper proposes a safe reinforcement learning algorithm for generation bidding decisions and unit maintenance scheduling in a competitive electricity market environment. In this problem, each unit aims to find a bidding strategy that maximizes its reve ...
It is well-known that for any integral domain R, the Serre conjecture ring R(X), i.e., the localization of the univariate polynomial ring R[X] at monic polynomials, is a Bezout domain of Krull dimension
Traditional competitive markets do not account for negative externalities; indirect costs that some participants impose on others, such as the cost of over-appropriating a common-pool resource (which diminishes future stock, and thus harvest, for everyone) ...
