Buy-It-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination Through Randomized Auctions

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Publications associées (4)

Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions

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We study a robust auction design problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller seeks a mechanism for selling multiple items to multiple anonymous bidders with additive values. The seller knows that the bidders' values range over a box uncertainty ...

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Distributional Robustness in Mechanism Design

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Mechanism design theory examines the design of allocation mechanisms or incentive systems involving multiple rational but self-interested agents and plays a central role in many societally important problems in economics. In mechanism design problems, agen ...

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On optimal bidding strategy modeling in the context of a liberalized electricity market

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The electricity markets worldwide have distinctive particularities due to some political and historical reasons. However, principal guidelines of market design remain very similar. The main feature of deregulation is to introduce a competition into the gen ...

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Buy-It-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination Through Randomized Auctions

Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions

Distributional Robustness in Mechanism Design

Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the Hungarian Method

On optimal bidding strategy modeling in the context of a liberalized electricity market