Mediaspace scheduled maintenance: Aug 25, 2026 07:00 - 12:00 AM. During this time, videos will be temporarily unavailable. Check status updates.

Recherche

Afficher tous les résultats pour

Accueil

Personne

Ludek Cigler

Cette personne a quitté l’EPFL

À propos
Confidentialité
Mentions légales

Graph Chatbot

Publications associées (5)

Page 1 sur 1

Multi-Agent Learning for Resource Allocation Problems

Ludek Cigler

We analyze resource allocation problems where N independent agents want to access C resources. Each resource can be only accessed by one agent at a time. In order to use the resources efficiently, the agents need to coordinate their access. We focus on dec ...

EPFL2013

Symmetric Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Resource Allocation

Boi Faltings, Ludek Cigler

We analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems, where the resources are all homogeneous. Bhaskar proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, ...

AI Access Foundation2014

Symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in resource allocation

Boi Faltings, Ludek Cigler

We analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems. (Bhaskar 2000) proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, 1-resource allocation games: Agent ...

2012

Decentralized Anti-coordination Through Multi-agent Learning

Boi Faltings, Ludek Cigler

To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How shall a designer ...

AI Access Foundation2013

Reaching Correlated Equilibria Through Multi-agent Learning

Boi Faltings, Ludek Cigler

Many games have undesirable Nash equilibria. For exam- ple consider a resource allocation game in which two players compete for an exclusive access to a single resource. It has three Nash equilibria. The two pure-strategy NE are effi- cient, but not fair. ...

2011