Majorité qualifiée

A supermajority, (supra-majority, supramajority, qualified majority, or special majority) is a requirement for a proposal to gain a specified level of support which is greater than the threshold of more than one-half used for a simple majority. Supermajority rules in a democracy can help to prevent a majority from eroding fundamental rights of a minority, but they can also hamper efforts to respond to problems and encourage corrupt compromises at times when action is taken. Changes to constitutions, especially those with entrenched clauses, commonly require supermajority support in a legislature. Parliamentary procedure requires that any action of a deliberative assembly that may alter the rights of a minority have a supermajority requirement, such as a two-thirds vote. Related concepts regarding alternatives to the majority vote requirement include a majority of the entire membership and a majority of the fixed membership. A supermajority can also be specified based on the entire membership or fixed membership rather than on those present and voting. The first known use of a supermajority rule was in the 100s BC in ancient Rome. Pope Alexander III introduced the use of supermajority rule for papal elections at the Third Lateran Council in 1179. In the Democratic Party of the United States, a rule requiring the determination of a presidential nominee required the votes of two-thirds of delegates to the Democratic National Convention was adopted at the party's first presidential nominating convention in 1832. The two-thirds rule gave southern Democrats a de facto veto over any presidential nominee after the Civil War, which lasted until the rule was abolished in 1936. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison were critical of supermajority requirements. In Federalist 22, Hamilton wrote that while preventing harmful legislation from being passed, such requirements also prevented beneficial legislation from being passed, and "its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent or corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority.