Axiom of global choiceIn mathematics, specifically in class theories, the axiom of global choice is a stronger variant of the axiom of choice that applies to proper classes of sets as well as sets of sets. Informally it states that one can simultaneously choose an element from every non-empty set. The axiom of global choice states that there is a global choice function τ, meaning a function such that for every non-empty set z, τ(z) is an element of z.
Axiom of dependent choiceIn mathematics, the axiom of dependent choice, denoted by , is a weak form of the axiom of choice () that is still sufficient to develop most of real analysis. It was introduced by Paul Bernays in a 1942 article that explores which set-theoretic axioms are needed to develop analysis. A homogeneous relation on is called a total relation if for every there exists some such that is true. The axiom of dependent choice can be stated as follows: For every nonempty set and every total relation on there exists a sequence in such that for all In fact, x0 may be taken to be any desired element of X.
Gödel numberingIn mathematical logic, a Gödel numbering is a function that assigns to each symbol and well-formed formula of some formal language a unique natural number, called its Gödel number. The concept was developed by Kurt Gödel for the proof of his incompleteness theorems. () A Gödel numbering can be interpreted as an encoding in which a number is assigned to each symbol of a mathematical notation, after which a sequence of natural numbers can then represent a sequence of symbols.
Truth functionIn logic, a truth function is a function that accepts truth values as input and produces a unique truth value as output. In other words: The input and output of a truth function are all truth values; a truth function will always output exactly one truth value; and inputting the same truth value(s) will always output the same truth value.
Axiom of countable choiceThe axiom of countable choice or axiom of denumerable choice, denoted ACω, is an axiom of set theory that states that every countable collection of non-empty sets must have a choice function. That is, given a function A with domain N (where N denotes the set of natural numbers) such that A(n) is a non-empty set for every n ∈ N, there exists a function f with domain N such that f(n) ∈ A(n) for every n ∈ N. The axiom of countable choice (ACω) is strictly weaker than the axiom of dependent choice (DC), which in turn is weaker than the axiom of choice (AC).
Predicate (mathematical logic)In logic, a predicate is a symbol that represents a property or a relation. For instance, in the first-order formula , the symbol is a predicate that applies to the individual constant . Similarly, in the formula , the symbol is a predicate that applies to the individual constants and . In the semantics of logic, predicates are interpreted as relations. For instance, in a standard semantics for first-order logic, the formula would be true on an interpretation if the entities denoted by and stand in the relation denoted by .
Löb's theoremIn mathematical logic, Löb's theorem states that in Peano arithmetic (PA) (or any formal system including PA), for any formula P, if it is provable in PA that "if P is provable in PA then P is true", then P is provable in PA. If Prov(P) means that the formula P is provable, we may express this more formally as If then An immediate corollary (the contrapositive) of Löb's theorem is that, if P is not provable in PA, then "if P is provable in PA, then P is true" is not provable in PA.
IntuitionIntuition is the ability to acquire knowledge, without recourse to conscious reasoning or needing an explanation. Different fields use the word "intuition" in very different ways, including but not limited to: direct access to unconscious knowledge; unconscious cognition; gut feelings; inner sensing; inner insight to unconscious pattern-recognition; and the ability to understand something instinctively, without any need for conscious reasoning. Intuitive knowledge tends to be approximate.
Natural numberIn mathematics, the natural numbers are the numbers 1, 2, 3, etc., possibly including 0 as well. Some definitions, including the standard ISO 80000-2, begin the natural numbers with 0, corresponding to the non-negative integers 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., whereas others start with 1, corresponding to the positive integers 1, 2, 3, ... Texts that exclude zero from the natural numbers sometimes refer to the natural numbers together with zero as the whole numbers, while in other writings, that term is used instead for the integers (including negative integers).
Berry paradoxThe Berry paradox is a self-referential paradox arising from an expression like "The smallest positive integer not definable in under sixty letters" (a phrase with fifty-seven letters). Bertrand Russell, the first to discuss the paradox in print, attributed it to G. G. Berry (1867–1928), a junior librarian at Oxford's Bodleian Library. Russell called Berry "the only person in Oxford who understood mathematical logic". The paradox was called "Richard's paradox" by Jean-Yves Girard.
ParadoxA paradox is a logically self-contradictory statement or a statement that runs contrary to one's expectation. It is a statement that, despite apparently valid reasoning from true premises, leads to a seemingly self-contradictory or a logically unacceptable conclusion. A paradox usually involves contradictory-yet-interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time. They result in "persistent contradiction between interdependent elements" leading to a lasting "unity of opposites".
