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Lecture

Agency: Contracts and Incentives

In course

MGT-301: Foundations in financial economics

The aim of this course is to expose EPFL bachelor students to some of the main areas in financial economics. The course will be organized around six themes. Students will obtain both practical insights through real-world examples and understand how one can ...

Description

This lecture covers the concepts of agency relationships, asymmetric information, moral hazard, linear contracts, risk preferences, utility functions, optimal contracts, first best outcomes, and properties affecting outcomes in the context of principal-agent interactions.

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Instructors (3)

Pierre Collin-Dufresne

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

RUEDIGER FAHLENBRACH is Full Professor at Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland. Formerly on the faculty of the Fisher College of Business of the Ohio State University (USA), he holds a Ph.D. in Finance from the University of Pennsylvania (Wharton). He holds a senior research chair from the Swiss Finance Institute, and is research member at the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). He has research interests in empirical corporate finance, in particular corporate governance and entrepreneurship. Ruediger Fahlenbrach has published in the leading academic journals in finance, including the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Review of Financial Studies and the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Ruediger currently serves a three year term as elected director of the European Finance Association (2018-2020). He is Associate Editor of the Review of Finance, and former associate editor of the Review of Financial Studies and Financial Management. His research has been reported in many large-circulation newspapers such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Le Temps, NZZ, Handelsblatt, Forbes Magazine, USA Today, and Fortune Magazine.

Julien Hugonnier

Official source

Related concepts (32)

Risk aversion

In economics and finance, risk aversion is the tendency of people to prefer outcomes with low uncertainty to those outcomes with high uncertainty, even if the average outcome of the latter is equal to or higher in monetary value than the more certain outcome. Risk aversion explains the inclination to agree to a situation with a more predictable, but possibly lower payoff, rather than another situation with a highly unpredictable, but possibly higher payoff.

Risk

In simple terms, risk is the possibility of something bad happening. Risk involves uncertainty about the effects/implications of an activity with respect to something that humans value (such as health, well-being, wealth, property or the environment), often focusing on negative, undesirable consequences. Many different definitions have been proposed. The international standard definition of risk for common understanding in different applications is "effect of uncertainty on objectives".

Risk neutral preferences

In economics and finance, risk neutral preferences are preferences that are neither risk averse nor risk seeking. A risk neutral party's decisions are not affected by the degree of uncertainty in a set of outcomes, so a risk neutral party is indifferent between choices with equal expected payoffs even if one choice is riskier. In the context of the theory of the firm, a risk neutral firm facing risk about the market price of its product, and caring only about profit, would maximize the expected value of its profit (with respect to its choices of labor input usage, output produced, etc.

Risk management

Risk management is the identification, evaluation, and prioritization of risks (defined in ISO 31000 as the effect of uncertainty on objectives) followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability or impact of unfortunate events or to maximize the realization of opportunities.

Contract theory

From a legal point of view, a contract is an institutional arrangement for the way in which resources flow, which defines the various relationships between the parties to a transaction or limits the rights and obligations of the parties. From an economic perspective, contract theory studies how economic actors can and do construct contractual arrangements, generally in the presence of information asymmetry. Because of its connections with both agency and incentives, contract theory is often categorized within a field known as law and economics.

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