Lecture

Linkability of e-passports

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In course

COM-506: Seminar on applied cryptography

This seminar introduces the participants to the current trends, problems, and methods in the area of communication security. ...

Description

This lecture covers the breaking of unlinkability of the ICAO 9303 Standard for e-Passports using Bisimilarity. It starts with an introduction to 7-calculus and reduction rules, followed by modeling BAC with #-calculus and the implications of MAC verification. The lecture then explores the unlinkability of BAC using T-calculus programs equivalence, trace equivalence, and examples illustrating trace equivalence. It delves into the unlinkability of BAC in terms of trace equivalence and discusses an attack on the UK implementation. The conclusion highlights the use of T-calculus in modeling cryptographic protocols and formalizing security properties, emphasizing the vulnerabilities of e-Passports to various attacks and the need for new protocols.

Instructor

Serge Vaudenay

Serge Vaudenay entered at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1989 with a major in mathematics. He earned his agrégation (secondary teaching degree) in mathematics in 1992, then a PhD in Computer Science at the University of Paris 7 - Denis Diderot in 1995. He subsequently became a senior research fellow at the CNRS, prior to being granted his habilitation à diriger des recherches (a postdoctoral degree authorizing the recipient to supervise doctoral students). In 1999, he was appointed as a Professor at the EPFL, where he created the Security and Cryptography Laboratory.

Official source

Related concepts (32)

Cryptographic primitive

Cryptographic primitives are well-established, low-level cryptographic algorithms that are frequently used to build cryptographic protocols for computer security systems. These routines include, but are not limited to, one-way hash functions and encryption functions. When creating cryptographic systems, designers use cryptographic primitives as their most basic building blocks. Because of this, cryptographic primitives are designed to do one very specific task in a precisely defined and highly reliable fashion.

Cryptography

Cryptography, or cryptology (from κρυπτός "hidden, secret"; and γράφειν graphein, "to write", or -λογία -logia, "study", respectively), is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of adversarial behavior. More generally, cryptography is about constructing and analyzing protocols that prevent third parties or the public from reading private messages. Modern cryptography exists at the intersection of the disciplines of mathematics, computer science, information security, electrical engineering, digital signal processing, physics, and others.

Process calculus

In computer science, the process calculi (or process algebras) are a diverse family of related approaches for formally modelling concurrent systems. Process calculi provide a tool for the high-level description of interactions, communications, and synchronizations between a collection of independent agents or processes. They also provide algebraic laws that allow process descriptions to be manipulated and analyzed, and permit formal reasoning about equivalences between processes (e.g., using bisimulation).

Key (cryptography)

A key in cryptography is a piece of information, usually a string of numbers or letters that are stored in a file, which, when processed through a cryptographic algorithm, can encode or decode cryptographic data. Based on the used method, the key can be different sizes and varieties, but in all cases, the strength of the encryption relies on the security of the key being maintained. A key's security strength is dependent on its algorithm, the size of the key, the generation of the key, and the process of key exchange.

Key-agreement protocol

In cryptography, a key-agreement protocol is a protocol whereby two or more parties can agree on a cryptographic key in such a way that both influence the outcome. If properly done, this precludes undesired third parties from forcing a key choice on the agreeing parties. Protocols that are useful in practice also do not reveal to any eavesdropping party what key has been agreed upon. Many key exchange systems have one party generate the key, and simply send that key to the other party—the other party has no influence on the key.

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