Mediaspace scheduled maintenance: Aug 25, 2026 07:00 - 12:00 AM. During this time, videos will be temporarily unavailable. Check status updates.

Concept

Principal–agent problem

Related publications (25)

Symmetric Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Resource Allocation

Boi Faltings, Ludek Cigler

We analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems, where the resources are all homogeneous. Bhaskar proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, ...

AI Access Foundation2014

Multi-Agent Learning for Resource Allocation Problems

Ludek Cigler

We analyze resource allocation problems where N independent agents want to access C resources. Each resource can be only accessed by one agent at a time. In order to use the resources efficiently, the agents need to coordinate their access. We focus on dec ...

EPFL2013

Optimal incentives and securitization of defaultable assets

Semyon Malamud

We study optimal securitization in the presence of an initial moral hazard. A financial intermediary creates and then sells to outside investors defaultable assets, whose default risk is determined by the unobservable costly effort exerted by the intermedi ...

Elsevier2013

CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

We study changes in chief executive officer (CEO) contracts when firms transition from public ownership with dispersed owners to private ownership with strong principals in the form of private equity sponsors. The most significant changes are that a signif ...

Elsevier2013

Real options and risk aversion

Erwan Morellec, Julien Hugonnier

In the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty, agents formulate optimal policies under the assumptions of risk neutrality or complete financial markets. Although these assumptions are crucial to the implications of the approach, the ...

2012